The publication of the posthumous memoirs of lawyer Abdur Razzaq, who served as Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami's 's assistant secretary general from 2003 to 2019 before quitting the party, reveals the internal disputes within its top echelon of the party over issuing a formal apology over its role during Bangladesh's Liberation War in 1971. In the memoir, he details the background to the push for an apology, the arguments for and against it, and the drafts prepared over more than two decades. The question of an apology first arose in 1994, Razzaq writes, ahead of a public address by then Jamaat ameer Ghulam Azam following a Supreme Court verdict that restored his Bangladeshi citizenship. Further moves related to the apology were made between 2001 and 2016.

The issue's significance takes on a new light following the Uprising of 2024, that brought Jamaat back into the political fold after the persecution it faced under the fallen Awami League. Recalling the 1994 attempt, Razzaq wrote that a committee was formed to assist Azam in preparing his speech. It suggested that he address Jamaat's role in 1971. However, when the moment came, Azam alluded to Jamaat's role only indirectly, in a one-line statement: "In the past, if I have committed any mistakes, please forgive me." Razzaq described this as a "half-hearted apology" at best.

The issue resurfaced after the four-party alliance's victory in the October 2001 elections, which Razzaq saw as another historic opportunity to address the 1971 question from "a position of strength". He began lobbying Jamaat to address the issue before December 16, Victory Day, and contacted three professors of Dhaka University, who readily agreed to help prepare a draft statement. Once the draft was ready, Razzaq embarked on the more difficult task of securing approval from the Jamaat leadership. The initial meeting was chaired by the then ameer Matiur Rahman Nizami and attended by senior leaders Ali Ahsan Mujahid, Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, Abdul Quader Mollah and ATM Azharul Islam. A small subcommittee was subsequently formed under Mujahid to finalise the draft. Only Azharul Islam is alive now.

The committee met at least half a dozen times to finalise the statement, and a tentative decision was made to hold a press conference before Victory Day. Mujahid, Kamaruzzaman and Mollah were very eager to see the matter through and close the chapter once and for all, according to Razzaq. However, Azharul, who became secretary general after the arrests of the ameer and secretary general in June 2010, had "his reservations". The matter was finally placed before the Working Committee in October 2005, four years after the draft apology had been prepared.

It exposes the complicated dynamics at play over the party's role in 1971, for which it has always remained a controversial actor in Bangladesh's politics. On the one hand, it wants to position itself as the prime advocate of the nation's Islamic identity. On the other, it shies away from looking at itself in the mirror and owning up to its past. Today, despite not being in government, it is arguably in a stronger position than it has ever been in the past. If apologising from 'a position of strength', as Razzaq sought, is the point, there has probably never been a better time for it.