The transition towards democracy in 1991, despite bestowing an electoral system considered free and fair, fell short in some other crucial ways. Broadly speaking, successive governments, and the body politic in general, never sought to strengthen or design the institutional frameworks necessary to consolidate democracy, or democratise further. Over the years, nascent institutions fell by the wayside in terms of achieving their original, stated objectives, while more mature ones were systematically stripped of their authority.

Take for instance, the Anti-Corruption Commission, that struggled for most of its existence as a 'toothless tiger', before being used by those in power to punish their political opponents. The political parties tried to capture the Election Commission and the only time the EC managed to function independently was under neutral governments - the bedrock of what gained the caretaker system wide acceptance among the population. It is a fact that the same EC that performed quite well under a CTG, failed to ensure the sanctity of the voting process when a political party was in power. The Public Service Commission meanwhile, was used to appoint party loyalists in key positions of the civil service, drastically compromising its role. Other bodies like the National Human Rights Commission or Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General remained largely moribund.

The persistent weakness of these institutions has exacted a heavy toll on the people's aspirations for a robust democracy, and despite having seemingly figured out the key to acceptable elections, the paradigm proved unsustainable, and the public had to pay a high price. Corruption was institutionalised allowing the party in power to distribute rents that helped it to maintain a clientelist network, the state machineries used coercive power to repress dissenting voices and the government could in effect exercise its power without restraint. The relentless centralisation of power reached alarming proportions during the last Awami League-led regime.

The lesson we must draw from the overall experience is that gunning for electoral accountability alone will not yield democracy, and more to the point - democratic consolidation, without which the sustainability of the process cannot be ensured. The vagaries of the winner-take-all system became even more pronounced, as the opposition was left with no incentive to participate in the formal political process.

The glaring absence of a system of checks and balances in our Constitution is something that must be addressed in light of the July 36 Uprising of 2024, and the reform process initiated by the interim government must leave us in place to do so. A transition towards democracy through focusing on the next election alone cannot and will not solve our political problems.

The need of the hour is an institutional framework where the legislative branch will be in a position to check executive overreach. In order to ensure consolidation of democracy, we must focus on building or strengthening horizontal accountability mechanisms. The bodies and agencies mentioned earlier must be given the foundations to act as independent institutions of accountability that must remain free from executive control. It won't happen in one day, or with the stroke of one's pen, certainly. The entire population, and political parties in particular, must engender the commitment to reforms over time - beyond electoral concerns. Only then can they be taken seriously.